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INVESTIGATING ALTERNATIVES TO RIGHTS:
THE HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AND
THE PROTECTION OF A MINIMUM LEVEL OF
ASSISTANCE
GrahaM reynoLds†

ABSTRACT
governments have decreased social assistance rates, reduced program
eligibility, and terminated social services. As a result, more and more
individuals have slipped into poverty. In order to prevent governments
from cutting these services to below subsistence levels, this paper
proposes that Canada take steps to achieve constitutional protection of a
minimum level of assistance. The concept of a constitutionally protected
minimum level of assistance has been considered. Most recently,
advocates focused their efforts on achieving constitutional protection
through the language of rights. However, both through the legislature
and the judiciary, these efforts have failed. This paper will attempt to
achieve protection without resorting to the language of rights. It will do
so by examining the law of Hungary, a country whose Constitutional
Court used the principles of legal certainty, legitimate expectations, and
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The most sacred of all laws, the welfare of the people,
The most irrefragable of all titles, necessity
— Robespierre1

In “On Revolution”, Hannah Arendt discusses the “social question”,
what she “better and more simply [calls] the existence of poverty”.2
Arendt describes poverty as:
a state of constant want and acute misery whose ignominy consists in
its dehumanizing force; poverty is abject because it puts men under
the absolute dictate of their bodies, that is, under the absolute dictate
of necessity as all men know it from their most intimate experience
and outside all speculations. It was under the rule of this necessity
that the multitude rushed to the assistance of the French Revolution,
inspired it, drove it onward, and eventually sent it to its doom, for
this was the multitude of the poor.3

The actual content of freedom, according to Arendt, is “participation
in public affairs”.4 However, as individuals cannot participate in public
affairs when they are under the “absolute dictate of their bodies”, freedom cannot be achieved while the social question remains unanswered.5
Thus, satisfaction of the dictate of necessity is not a distraction from
freedom, as Arendt states.6 It is a pre-condition of freedom. Consequently, it was in the effort to create the conditions for freedom, and not in
its abdication, that Robespierre turned his attention to the “rights of the
Sans-Culottes…dress, food and the reproduction of their species”.7
In Canada, many individuals, shackled to the “absolute dictate of
necessity”, have not achieved freedom. In order to create the conditions
for their freedom, Canada must implement a plan to satisfy the basic

1
Maximilian Robespierre, Oeuvres, vol. 3 (Paris: Laponneraye, 1840) at 514, cited in Hannah
Arendt, On Revolution (New York: The Viking Press, 1963) at 54 [Arendt].
2
Arendt, ibid.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid. at 25.
5
Ibid. at 54.
6
Ibid. at 55.
7
Ibid. at 54-55.

ALTERNATIVES TO RIGHTS . . . 165

needs of its citizens. This paper proposes that Canada do so through the
constitutional protection of a minimum level of assistance.8
of assistance that is adequate to satisfy the basic needs of the individual
in matters such as food, clothing, housing, medical care, and necessary
social services.9 Though Canadian governments would retain the ability to restructure the social welfare system, constitutional protection of
a minimum level of assistance would compel the government to keep
necessary for one’s basic needs) at set levels (the adequate level of assistance).
Achieving constitutional protection of a minimum level of assistance will achieve positive gains for individuals, a vulnerable group, and
society. Individuals, free from the dictate of necessity, will be able to
exercise their rights through full participation in democratic discourse.10
The poverty collective, a vulnerable group, will begin to see its interests
protected and its rights assured. Through these gains, Canadian society
will draw closer to the deliberative democratic ideal of “authorship by
everyone…of the fundamental laws”.11 Given the importance of achieving protection for individuals, the poverty collective, and Canadian
democracy, it is essential that this protection occur through a constitutional mechanism. Without constitutional protection, the level of assistance would remain subject to the “potentially destructive reach of
governments”.12
8

It is the position of this paper that although individuals in poverty theoretically possess the
same civil and political rights as all other Canadians, these rights cannot be fully exercised until
assistance, is achieved. Thus, this paper takes the position that social and economic rights are
necessary pre-conditions to the full enjoyment of civil and political rights.
9

Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217
(III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, UN Doc. A/810 (1948) 71 [UDHR].
10
It should be noted that the poor do have some form of political voice, as evidenced by antipoverty civil disobedience, constitutional litigation, etc. However, in many instances, those
speaking for the poor are not the poor themselves.
11
Frank Michelman, “How Can the People Ever Make Laws? A Critique of Deliberative Democracy”, in James Bohman & William Rehg, eds., Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason
and Politics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997) at 151 [Michelman].
12
Joel Bakan & David Schneiderman, eds., Social Justice and the Constitution (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1992) at 5 [Social Justice].
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It is realistic to expect that without a constitutional bulwark, governments will continue to cut social services. In recent years, in the attempt
assistance rates, reduced program eligibility, and terminated social services. As a result, more and more individuals are slipping through the
cracks into a state of “constant want and acute misery”.13 Constitutional
protection of a minimum level of assistance must be secured as soon as
possible.
The concept of a constitutionally protected minimum level of assistance has been considered. Most recently, advocates have focused their
efforts on achieving constitutional protection through the language of
rights. However, both through the legislature and the judiciary, these
efforts have failed. Given the failure of rights to achieve constitutional
protection of a minimum level of assistance, continuing to force discussions through the language of rights risks exhausting debate on the
issue. If the same arguments continue to be raised and rejected, debate
will slowly grind to a halt. Given the importance of protecting a minimum level of assistance, this is unacceptable.
In the interest of continuing debate, and with the ultimate goal of
securing constitutional protection for a minimum level of assistance, it
is necessary to subvert the contemporary reliance on rights, allowing the
concept of a minimum level of assistance to be presented through other
institutional instruments. As noted by Wiktor Osiatynski in “On Social
and Economic Rights: A Needs-Based Approach”:
of the language of rights in social and economic spheres. A more
fruitful approach would be to acknowledge the existence of legitimate
social, economic, and cultural needs of individuals and groups of
means and instruments. Rights and the mechanisms for enforcement
of rights will cover only one section of this spectrum.14

In seeking to provide constitutional protection for a minimum level of
social assistance without resorting to the language of rights, it is helpful
13

14

Arendt, supra note 1 at 54.

Wiktor Osiatynski, “On Social and Economic Rights: A Needs-Based Approach” online:
<http://www.newschool.edu/tcds/on%20social%20and%20econ.pdf>.
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to look outside Canada to nations who have managed to accomplish a
similar task. One such country is Hungary.
In 1995, the Hungarian government wished to pass legislation tertutionality of the legislation, the Hungarian Constitutional Court, due
to particular features of the Hungarian Constitution, could not rely on
the language of rights. Instead, the Court applied the principles of legal
legislation unconstitutional. This paper, in seeking to achieve Canadian
constitutional protection for a minimum level of assistance without resorting to the language of rights, will attempt to apply these principles,
dence.
Through the course of this paper, it will be found that these principles, so successfully used by the Hungarian Constitutional Court, will
not, in all probability, achieve the same results in the Canadian context.
However, though a solution to the social question may not be found
in the following pages, the act of analysis itself is necessary. In Canada, the attempts to achieve constitutional protection for a minimum
level of assistance through rights have failed. Given the importance of
achieving such protection, it is necessary to examine alternatives until a solution is found. Proceeding through rights discourse alone risks
exhausting debate. As long as solutions and alternatives continue to be
proposed, examined, and evaluated, the social question will not remain
unanswered.

I. THE IMPORTANCE OF A CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED
MINIMUM LEVEL OF ASSISTANCE
1. Individual
As a nation committed to the ideal of democracy and the rule of law, it is
crucial for Canada to institute constitutional protection for a minimum
individuals, a vulnerable group, and Canadian society.
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On the individual level, constitutional protection of a minimum
level of assistance gives Canadians the opportunity to escape from the
“dehumanizing force” of poverty, achieving a direct and substantial improvement in their health and welfare. In addition to helping improve
an individual’s physical conditions, protection of a minimum level of

hot meal, a bed to sleep in, or a jacket to wear, all of their rights become
“thin and impoverished”.15 The satisfaction of one’s basic needs is a precondition to the full enjoyment of every right. As such, constitutional
protection of a minimum level of assistance gives content to the rights
of an individual.
Individuals cannot participate in public affairs while they are under
the “absolute dictate of their bodies”.16 Escape from the dictate of necessity gives individuals the opportunity to participate in public discourse.
Habermas notes that “citizens can make appropriate use of their public
17
The constitutional protection of a minimum level of assistance allows individuals to
achieve independence from necessity. Having achieved private autonomy, individuals can make appropriate use of their public autonomy.18
2. Group
On a group level, constitutional protection of a minimum level of assistance is necessary to secure protection for the poverty collective. The
exist in poverty, exists as a vulnerable group. Without constitutional
protection, it is likely that their interests will continue to be “overlooked
and their rights to equal concern and respect violated”.19
lack political power. The poverty collective is among those groups in
15

Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 at para. 73 [Eldridge].
Arendt, supra note 1 at 54.
17
Jurgen Habermas, “Remarks on Legitimation through Human Rights” (1998) 42 Philosophy
and Soc. Crit. 157 at 161 [Habermas].
18
Ibid.
19
Law Society of British Columbia v. Andrews, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 at para. 5 [Andrews].
16
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society, noted in Andrews,
have no apparent interest in attending”.20 Furthermore, the poverty colWhether poverty is seen as temporary condition brought on by economic hardship or the inevitable consequence of immutable personal
characteristics,21 very few individuals, if any, seek to identify positively
with the condition of poverty. As a result, the collective is dispersed,
made even more vulnerable by the desire of its members to disassociate
from it.
3. Canadian society
On a societal level, constitutional protection of a minimum level of assistance gives Canada’s laws legitimacy. As well, it brings Canada closer towards the deliberative democratic ideal of full participation. Habermas notes that “a law may claim legitimacy only if all those possibly
affected could consent to it after participating in rational discourses”.22
As noted above, those individuals living under the dictate of necessity
cannot participate in public affairs. Thus, they are affected by laws to
which they cannot possibly consent. Until the poverty collective defeats
the dictate of necessity through the institution of a minimum level of
assistance, Canada’s laws may not claim legitimacy.
As well as legitimating the legal-political structure, the constitutional protection of a minimum level of assistance brings Canada closer
to the deliberative democratic procedural ideal of political rightness,
who stands to be governed by or under them”.23 With their basic needs

20

Ibid.

21

B. Singh Bolaria & Terry Wotherspoon, “Income Inequality, Poverty, and Hunger”, in B
Singh Bolaria ed., Social Issues and Contradictions in Canadian Society, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Harcourt Canada, 2000) at 85 [Bolaria].
22
Habermas, supra note 17 at 160.
23

Michelman, supra note 11 at 148-150.
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II. THE DECLINE OF THE CANADIAN SOCIAL WELFARE STATE
treated from the provision of social welfare. In the face of international
economic pressure, and in the desire to pay down debt and draft balanced
24

cuts to social services. Through the 1980’s, provincial governments, “in
of social spending”.25 In 1990, the Federal Government, “through its
policy of budgetary restraint”, capped “contributions to social welfare
programs [previously]…agreed to in cost-sharing arrangements with
the provinces”.26 In 1995, the Federal Government repealed the protections in the Canada Assistance Plan. Accompanying that announcement
was “$7 billion in cuts from the Federal Government to…provinces for
their social programs”.27 In 2002, the government of British Columbia
cut rates for social assistance recipients and narrowed the rules governing eligibility for social assistance recipients, resulting in “many people
who [were] eligible for social assistance being disentitled”.28
As a result of these cuts, a greater number of Canadians will expefood, clothing, and shelter, and too little hope”.29 Still burdened by debt
draw funds from social services until they are prohibited from doing so
by a constitutional safeguard.

24

Social Justice, supra note 12 at 5.
Social Justice, supra note 12 at 5.
26
Social Justice, supra note 12 at 5.
27
Charter Committee on Poverty Issues (CCPI), Submissions to the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights by the Charter Committee on Poverty Issues (CCPI), (16 November
1998), online: <http://www.equalityrights.org/ngoun98/ccpi.htm#part5> [CCPI].
25

28

BC Coalition of Women’s Centres, Media Advisory--Submission to United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (11 February 2002), online: <http://www3.telus.
net/bcwomen/archives/ICESCR_Feb_02.html>.
29
Ann Duffy and Nancy Mandell, “The Growth in Poverty and Social Inequality: Losing Faith
in Social Justice”, in Dan Glenday and Ann Duffy, eds. Canadian Society (Toronto: Oxford
University Press, 2001) at 77 [Duffy].
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III. ACHIEVING PROTECTION THROUGH RIGHTS
In recent years, advocates have attempted to achieve constitutional protection for a minimum level of social assistance primarily through the
vehicle of rights, both through the wholesale adoption of a charter of social and economic rights and the judicial interpretation of charter rights.
Neither attempt has succeeded.
1. Social and Economic Rights
Representing “claims by individuals for an equitable share of economic
and social resources”, social and economic rights were promoted mainly by “East Bloc and developing countries…as elements needed to stem
the excesses of free-market economies and capitalism and to ensure
equality of all participants”.30 Included in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (1948),31
tected in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR) (1966).32 The right to a minimum level of assistance
33

In 1992, Canadians were asked to endorse the Charlottetown Accord, a set of proposals for constitutional amendment. One provision
in the Accord dealt with the inclusion of a charter of social rights in the
Canadian constitution.34 However, along with the rest of the Charlottetown Accord, the social union provision was discarded.35

30

Hugh M. Kindred, ed., International Law, 6th ed. (Toronto, Emond Montgomery, 2000) at
781.
31
UDHR, supra note 9.
32

United Nations, International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, (registered
on 3 January 1976) [ICESCR].

33

Ibid. Article 9 of the ICESCR provides that: The States Parties to the present Covenant
recognize the right of every one to social security, including social insurance; Article 11(1) of
the ICESCR provides that: The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of
everyone to a minimum standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food,
clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect
the essential importance of international co-operation based on free consent.

34
35

Joel Bakan, Just Words (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) at 135.
Ibid.
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2. Judicial Interpretation of the Charter
As well as through the amendment process, individuals have tried to
secure constitutional status for a minimum level of assistance through
judicial interpretation of Charter rights. It has been argued that certain
provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter)
and the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms should be interpreted to include protection for a minimum level of assistance. Arguments for inclusion have centered upon three provisions, namely sections 7 and 15 of the Charter, 36 and section 45 of the Quebec Charter.
37

As noted by the Charter Committee on Poverty Issues (CCPI), “s. 7
is the lynch pin for constitutional protection of basic social and economic rights”.38 Consequently, “people in poverty…have been vigorously
seeking to have section 7 interpreted consistently with the Covenant”.39
For instance, in Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), it was argued
that “the section 7 right to security of the person includes the right to
receive a particular level of social assistance from the state adequate to
meet basic needs”.40 Louise Gosselin argued that the state deprived her
violated the principles of fundamental justice”.41
36
Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms states that “Everyone: everyone
has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice; while s. 15 states that: (1)
Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and

on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. (2)
Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged
because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. ” See the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter].
37
Section 45 of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms provides that: every perby law, susceptible of ensuring such person an acceptable standard of living”. See Charter of
Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q. c. C-12, s. 45, cited in Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429 at 85 [Gosselin].
38
CCPI, supra note 27.
39
CCPI, supra note 27.
40
Gosselin, supra note 37 at para. 75.
41
Gosselin, supra note 37 at para. 75.
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The Court, through a narrow interpretation of section 7, rejected
Gosselin’s claim. Firstly, McLachlin C.J. noted that “s. 7 does not protect against all measures that might in some way impinge on life, liberty
or security, but only against those that can be attributed to state action
implicating the administration of justice”.42 As interpreted by the Court,
the harm to Gosselin did not occur as a result of her “interaction with
the justice system and its administration”.43 Secondly, though acknowledging that section 7 can be interpreted, in certain situations, to protect
“economic rights fundamental to human…survival”, the Court held that
this was not one of those situations. Thirdly, even if section 7 could be
read to encompass economic rights, McLachlin C.J. noted that “nothing
in the jurisprudence thus far suggests that section 7 places a positive
obligation on the state to ensure that each person enjoys life, liberty or
security of the person”.44 Instead, section 7 has been consistently seen
as a negative right, restricting the state’s ability to deprive individuals
of life, liberty, or security of the person. Though McLachlin C.J. leaves
open the possibility that “a positive obligation to sustain life, liberty, or
security of the person may be made out in special circumstances”, she
maintains that the “frail [factual] platform” of this case does not meet
those special circumstances.45
it would not interpret section 7 as protecting a minimum level of assistance, the Supreme Court of Canada has stopped short of providing any
actual protection.46
In certain situations, section 15, the equality rights provision of the
Charter, has imposed positive obligations on governments to allocate
resources to “alleviate disadvantages that exist independently of state
action”.47 Such was the case in Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney
General), where the Supreme Court of Canada held that the “failure to
provide sign language interpretation services under the provincial Medical and Health Care Services Act and Hospital Insurance Act violated

42

Gosselin, supra note 37 at para. 77.
Gosselin, supra note 37 at para. 77.
44
Gosselin, supra note 37 at para. 81.
45
Gosselin, supra note 37 at para. 83.
46
Gosselin, supra note 37 at para. 80.
43

47

Eldridge, supra note 15 at para. 73.
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the appellants’ Charter right to equality without discrimination based on
physical disability”.48
As a result of Eldridge, it has been argued that the Charter “imposes
positive obligations on governments to allocate resources and to implement programmes to address social and economic disadvantage”.49
However, this argument has not been successful in securing protection
for a minimum level of assistance. As noted by the CCPI, it appears as
if “the same narrow and restrictive interpretation which governments
are arguing with respect to section 7 is happening in cases involving the
equality guarantee in section 15 of the Charter”.50
Section 45 of the Quebec Charter provides that every person in need
provided for by law, susceptible of ensuring such person an acceptable
standard of living”.51 In its construction, it is very similar to Article 11 of
the ICESCR, which provides that every state has an “adequate core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, adequate essential
levels of subsistence needs and the provision of basic services”.52
In Gosselin, the court struggled between two competing interpretations of section 45. However, instead of holding that section 45 gives
courts the ability to review the adequacy of social assistance measures,
the Supreme Court of Canada held that the phrase “susceptible of ensuring…an acceptable standard of living” allows the court only to specify
“the kind of measures the state is obliged to provide…and cannot ground
a review of their adequacy”.53
In 1998, the CCPI stated that “the Charter is the tool which the poor
and other equality seekers are looking to in order to guarantee the legal
protections contemplated by the Covenant”.54 However, the Charter, and
rights discourse more generally, has not been effective. Canadian courts
have “routinely opt[ed] for an interpretation which excludes protection

48

CCPI, supra note 27.
CCPI, supra note 27.
50
CCPI, supra note 27.
51
Gosselin, supra note 37 at para. 85.
52
ICESCR, supra note 32.
53
Gosselin, supra note 37 at paras. 87, 88.
54
CCPI, supra note 27.
49
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to a minimum standard of living and other Covenant rights”.55 True
progress towards a minimum level of assistance has yet to be achieved
through rights.

IV. SEEKING AN ALTERNATIVE TO RIGHTS
It is possible that the failure of rights discourse to achieve constitutional
protection for a minimum level of assistance stems from a reluctance
to guarantee the normative content of the right. That is to say, perhaps
Canadians simply don’t believe that governments should take steps to
satisfy the basic needs of their citizens. In this case, as citizens and the
courts object to the fact of protection itself, the search for a new tool
with which to guarantee protection would be futile.
However, this position is inconsistent with Canada’s history as a social welfare state. Throughout the 20th century, Canadian governments
have instituted social programs that extol, as their goal, the satisfaction
of the basic needs of the individual. To many, the programs created in
support of this goal “are considered part of the panoply of rights and
privileges attaching to Canadian citizenship”.56
Thus, it appears as if the issue could be institutional, and not normative. Canadians don’t necessarily disagree with the concept of protecting
a minimum level of assistance. Instead, their resistance may be centered
on the institutional expression of this concept through rights. Such an
issue is uncommon in constitutional law. Generally, when protection is
sought for an interest, debate focuses upon whether the interest merits
protection, and not whether the institutional form in which the interest
is presented is acceptable.57
Recognizing the importance of achieving constitutional protection,
and in the effort to continue debate, an alternative approach to that of
rights must be found. In attempting to reach a solution, it is helpful
55

United Nations, Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, “Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Right--Canada” in Consideration
of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, (4 December
1998) at para. 15. online: <http://www.web.net/~ngoun98/conclud98.htm>.
56
Social Justice, supra note 12 at 4.
57
One example is the debate surrounding the inclusion of pornography within the right to freedom of speech.
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to turn to countries who have managed to solve a similar problem, in
order to determine whether their reasoning can apply in the Canadian
context.

V. THE HUNGARIAN BENEFITS CASE
1. Background
In the fall of 1989, Hungary58
liamentary democracy59 and a free market economy.60 Struggling under
the weight of an enormous internal and foreign debt, Hungary was vulnerable to pressure from foreign lending institutions and organizations
like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union
(EU).61
For a period of time, the Hungarian government resisted the urge
to curb state socialist spending practices.62
creased, the welfare system began to be seen less as “an important remedy helping the government…smooth the social and political transition”,
and more as a “major source of budgetary problems, incorporating costly and wasteful subsystems that impose a heavy burden on the economy
and constrain its growth potential”.63
In 1995, faced with the reality that “servicing the debt risked plunging the country into bankruptcy”, the socialist government introduced a
comprehensive economic emergency plan (the Economic Stabilization
Act).64 The major thrust of this plan was:
58

It should be noted that Hungary has a civil law system.
Hungary’s Negotiated Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996) at 361 [Tokes].
60
United States of America, Central Intelligence Agency, Hungary, online: The World Factbook
<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/hu.html>.
59

61

Andras Sajo, “How the Rule of Law Killed Hungarian Welfare Reform” (1996) 5:1 East
European Constitutional Review, reprinted in Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet, Comparative
Constitutional Law (New York: Foundation Press, 1999) 1465 at 1469 [Sajo].
62
Ibid.
63

László Halpern and Charles Wyplosz, eds., Hungary: Towards a Market Economy (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1998) at 335 [Halpern].
64
Sajo, supra note 61 at 1469.
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a substantial cut in the government’s expenditures on welfare

austerity package curbed social spending by explicitly tightening
eligibility rules and the quality of welfare programmes.65

While the Act was being debated, concerned Hungarian citizens submitted petitions to the Constitutional Court,66 protesting the fact that the
The
Constitutional Court reviewed the case (dubbed the Hungarian Ben) with “exceptional urgency”, determining that some welfare
changes could not enter into force because they lacked an adequate adjustment period, and that other restrictions were “unconstitutional and
void per se, irrespective of their date of entry into force”.68
67

2. Logic of the Hungarian Constitutional Court
Article 70/E of the Hungarian Constitution gives Hungarian citizens the
right to social assistance.69 In earlier cases, the Constitutional Court interpreted this right as guaranteeing only subsistence-level care.70 The
Economic Stabilization Act annulled or altered programs above the level
of subsistence protection. It did not challenge subsistence-level protection itself.71 Thus, in analyzing the constitutionality of the proposed cuts
65

Halpern, supra note 63 at 301.

66

assume its responsibilities
67

, 43/1995 (VL30) AB Decision, [1997] 4 E. Eur. Case Rep. Const. L.
64 (Hungarian Constitutional Court), reprinted in Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet, Comparative Constitutional Law (New York: Foundation Press, 1999) 1452 [
].
68
Sajo, supra note 61 at 1470.
69

Article 70/E of the Hungarian Constitution provides that: (1) Citizens of the Republic of
Hungary have the right to social security; they are entitled to the support required to live in old
age, and in the case of sickness, disability, being widowed or orphaned and in the case of unemployment through no fault of their own. (2) The Republic of Hungary shall implement the right
to social support through the social security system and the system of social institutions. See
Hungary, Constitution, online: <http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/hu00000_.html>.
70
Sajo, supra note 61 at 1472.
71
Sajo, supra note 61 at 1472.
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to social services, the Constitutional Court could not rely on the concept
stitutional Court based its decision on the principles of legal certainty,
legitimate expectations, and property protection. In so doing, the court
managed to protect programs threatened by the Economic Stabilization
Act without turning to the language of rights.
According to the Hungarian Constitutional Court, the government,
72
erated legitimate expectations of welfare support. As a result of these
choices. For instance, a family may have decided that they could afford to have a second child based on the allowances and fees generated
73
lies”. With the passage of the Economic Stabilization Act, many social
would disappear. As a result, the legitimate expectations of thousands of
Hungarian families would be violated.
The Court states that the violation of these legitimate expectations
defeats the principle of legal certainty, “the most substantial conceptual
element of a constitutional state and the theoretical basis for acquired
rights”.74
75
In the interest of
night”.76 The Constitutional Court noted that:
it is a requirement adequate to the constitutional state…that the
behaviour of the State be calculable, so that both natural and legal
persons be able to plan with good grounds in making their economicor family- or livelihood-related decisions and that they be able to
infer the will of the State incorporated into legal relations.77

72

Sajo, supra note 61 at 1472.
, supra note 67 at 1453.
74
, supra note 67 at 1456.
75
, supra note 67 at 1456.
76
, supra note 67 at 1456.
77
, supra note 67 at 1461.
73
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the Court ordered the institution of a transition period before certain sofrom the Court’s decision how long expectations are to be respected”.78
It could potentially be years before the Hungarian government is perFurthermore, in its decision, the Hungarian Constitutional Court ading a mandatory insurance component. Through mandatory insurance,
the state draws assets from the individual which the individual could
have otherwise used to protect his/her family, and places these assets in
the service of social security based on the principle of solidarity.79 The
Constitutional Court states that the constitutionality of the “reduction
criteria of “protection of property”.80 Sajo notes that in the Hungarian
constitutional context:

promised by earlier legislation, unless the legislature can prove to
the Court that the taking serves the public interest and only if there
is full and immediate compensation.81

full compensation is provided. As Sajo states, “such compensation is
highly unlikely”.82
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VI. APPLYING THE PRINCIPLES OF THE HUNGARIAN BENEFITS
CASE TO CANADIAN JURISPRUDENCE
The Hungarian Constitutional Court, in determining the constitutionality
of the Economic Stabilization Act, circumvented social rights by basing
its decision on the principles of legal certainty, legitimate expectations,
and property protection. Perhaps the application of these principles will
help Canadian courts shake their reliance on rights, allowing the constitutional protection of a minimum level of assistance to be achieved
through other institutional means.
In Canada, there has been the growth of a “public expectation that
the state meet [the] basic needs of its citizens as a matter of legal obligation”.83 While recognizing that governments maintain the ability to
adjust social programs, Canadians expect that social services will remain, at the very least, at the minimum level of assistance. Applying
the principles from the
it can be argued that if
to fall below this level, the legitimate expectations of Canadians will be
violated, thus defeating the principle of legal certainty. Social services
with an element of mandatory insurance could potentially be buttressed
with a greater degree of protection due to their contributory element.
In analyzing whether the principles utilized in Hungary can apply in

1. Legal certainty
As noted above, in the
the Hungarian Constitutional Court declared that “legal certainty…is the most substantial
conceptual element of a constitutional state”.84 The Hungarian Constitutional Court invalidated the Economic Stabilization Act largely because
by passing the Act, the government would defeat the principle of legal
certainty.
In Canadian jurisprudence, “legal certainty”, far from being the most
substantial conceptual element of the Canadian constitutional state, is a
83
84
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minor concept. Legal certainty is referred to only twice by the Supreme
Court of Canada, both references occurring in the context of preferring
written over unwritten constitutions. In the Quebec Secession Reference,
the Court notes that “a written constitution promotes legal certainty and
predictability”.85 In the Reference re: Remuneration of the Judges of the
Provincial Court, the Court states that there are “many important reasons for the preference for a written constitution over an unwritten one,
not the least of which is the promotion of legal certainty and through it
the legitimacy of constitutional judicial review”.86
Using this limited Canadian jurisprudence, it could be argued that
certainty and predictability. Just as a written constitution helps individuindividuals predict government behaviour, thus allowing individuals to
plan important life decisions. As a result, it could be argued that in order to promote legal certainty, an adjustment period must be instituted
cessful in Hungary. However, in Canada, such an argument would run
tion 42(1) of the federal Interpretation Act, which states that ‘every Act
shall be construed as to reserve to Parliament the power of repealing or
amending it’”.87 As a result, this argument, as was the case in Reference
Re: Canada Assistance Plan, would likely be dismissed.
Nevertheless, in Vriend v. Alberta, the Supreme Court of Canada
cited with approval a passage by William Black in “Vriend, Rights,
and Democracy”, which stated that “democracy requires that all citizens be allowed to participate in the democratic process, either directly
or through equal consideration by their representatives. Parliamentary
sovereignty is a means to this end, not an end in itself”.88
Individuals cannot participate in public affairs if they are living under the dictate of necessity. Thus, while parliamentary sovereignty is
a means through which individuals may participate in the democratic
process, the satisfaction of necessity is a pre-condition to this participa85
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tion. Before the principle of parliamentary sovereignty can be applied,
Consequently, notwithstanding the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, the court could use the principle of legal certainty to invalidate
legislation cutting social services below the adequate level of assistance.
In this situation, “where the interests of a minority [the poverty collective] have been denied consideration…judicial intervention is warranted to correct a democratic process that has acted improperly”.89 If this
is argument is accepted by the court, an exception could be carved out
shall not be repealed or amended if doing so would cause social assistance to fall below the minimum level.
2. Legitimate expectations
In the

the Hungarian Constitutional Court

legitimate expectations of social support for its citizens. As a result of
these legitimate expectations, the government could not withdraw cerIn seeking to provide Canadian constitutional protection for a minimum level of assistance, it could be argued that the Canadian government, by virtue of the fact that it is an advanced modern welfare state
ing legislation, created legitimate expectations that it would provide for
the basic needs of its citizens. As a result of these legitimate expectations, the government would not be permitted to set social services at
rates below the minimum level of assistance.
However, such an argument would be problematic given the current
state of the Canadian doctrine of legitimate expectations. In Canada,
one, and claims are not often successful”.90 Originally a British concept designed for administrative law, legitimate expectations was used
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to extend the situations in which the duty of fairness is owed.91 Though
the Supreme Court of Canada integrated the British concept into Canadian law, “its judgments have…considerably restricted the situations in
which it applies”.92
The Canadian doctrine was severely limited with the Court’s decision in Reference Re: Canada Assistance Plan. Under the Canada
Assistance Plan (CAP), the federal government concluded agreements
with the provinces to pay half of the provinces’ eligible expenditures for
social assistance. The agreement was open to amendment or termination
by mutual consent, or could be terminated on one year’s notice from
either party. In 1990, the federal government, seeking to reduce the fedof payments made to British Columbia, Alberta, and Ontario under the
Canada Assistance Plan. It did not give one year’s notice before amending the agreement. 93
The Government of British Columbia argued that “the agreement
gave the province a legitimate expectation that it would be consulted
and its consent would be obtained before changes were made to the
agreement, unless the one year’s notice was given”.94 This argument,
though accepted by the Court of Appeal, was rejected by the Supreme
Court of Canada on the basis that the doctrine of legitimate expectations
does not apply to legislative decisions and that it cannot be used to create substantive rights.
Given the CAP decision, the use of the Canadian doctrine of legitimate expectations to achieve constitutional protection for a minimum
level of assistance is problematic. Firstly, many cuts to social services
occur through acts of the legislature. For instance, in CAP, withdrawals
to the CAP plan were embodied in the Government Expenditures Restraint Act.95 As a result, these cuts are presumptively out of reach of the
doctrine. David Wright, in “Rethinking the Doctrine of Legitimate Exfor restricting the doctrine to administrative functions, noting that “the
introduction of legislation [is] a fundamental part of the legislative proc91
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ess, and using the doctrine of legitimate expectations to restrict would
interfere with Parliamentary sovereignty”.96
However, as discussed in the context of legal certainty, there are
certain situations when it is legitimate to restrict Parliamentary sovereignty. As noted above, the protection of a minimum level of assistance
is one such situation. Though unlikely, it may be possible to create an
exception to the principle that the doctrine of legitimate expectations
applies only to legislative acts in order to protect a minimum level of
assistance.
The requirement that legitimate expectations cannot be used to create
had a legitimate expectation of a substantive right: the public expected
CAP, the termination of government
expectations. Due to the fact that, in Canada, the doctrine of legitimate
expectations cannot be used to create substantive rights, advocates of
a minimum level of assistance would not be able to use the doctrine to
prevent the government from setting social assistance rates at a belowsubsistence level.
Nevertheless, Wright notes that the “focus on the fact that substantive legitimate expectations are not protected in [Canada] has obscured
the possibility that the promise of a substantive result could give rise to
procedural protections”.97 Such an argument, though it has been raised
by “few plaintiffs in Canadian legitimate expectation cases”, could
level of assistance.98 Though ineffective in stopping governments from
withdrawing social services, it could be held that the implied promise by
Canadian governments to satisfy the basic needs of its citizens gives rise
to enhanced procedural protections when governments contemplate setting social assistance rates below the level of subsistence. Such a result
would mandate the participation of and consultation with the poverty
cision is made which also takes into account the interests of those with
96
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a greater interest in its outcome than the average citizen”.99 The ability
of the doctrine of legitimate expectations to create a right to “make repCAP.100
In addition to the possibility of securing enhanced procedural protections through the doctrine of legitimate expectations, Wright also
suggests that courts extend the review for fairness in the case of delegated legislation in order to ensure that “those whose lives or activities
are affected by a decision have the opportunity to be consulted”.101 As
noted earlier, the poverty collective has no resources or political power.
regarded. It is submitted that in Canada, the review for fairness should
be extended to the poverty collective in situations where the legislature
is contemplating decreasing assistance to below-subsistence rates. As
Wright notes:
interest”, certain people bear the brunt of these decisions, and it is
crucial to require some consultation with them when the decisions
are being made. At the very least, this is because people have
planned their lives based on the existing state of affairs. Welfare
recipients, for example, have signed leases and made budgeting
decisions on the basis of the amount of assistance being provided.
Without consultation, these special needs may be ignored by the
delegated decisionmaker. Although there may have been no clear
certain level for a certain time, the special needs of people in these
situations are at least as important as those to whom representations
have been made.102

Though the Canadian doctrine of legitimate expectations would not allow courts to invalidate legislation simply on the basis that it breached
an implied promise that assistance would not be cut below the level of
subsistence, courts may read in a duty to consult. This duty would not
prevent the legislature from cutting social services. However, it would,
at the very least, ensure the presence of the poverty collective during
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negotiations. For a vulnerable group who has been overlooked and disregarded, the opportunity to have one’s voice heard is an important step
forward.
3. Property protection
In addition to the principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectations, the Hungarian Constitutional Court applied the concepts of mandatory insurance and property protection in order to invalidate legislation

“the legislature can prove to the Court that the taking serves the public
interest and only if there is full and immediate compensation”.103
Due to historical differences between the two nations, the principle
of property protection would not likely advance the cause of Canadian
constitutional protection of a minimum level of assistance. In Hungary,
private property is seen as “an important guarantee of personal autonomy”.104 In response to the eradication of private property by former
Communist governments, the Hungarian Constitution “protects the
right to property as the traditional material base of individual autonomy
in action”.105
A strong connection has been forged in Hungary between property
and social services. Laszlo Solyom, former Chief Justice of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, stated in a 1993 concurring opinion that “in order to assure the autonomy-granting function of property, the functional
equivalent of property, namely, welfare entitlement, should also receive
property-like protection”.106
In Canada, early charter critics were concerned that property protection could be used to “thwart governments from redistributing property
rights or economic entitlements, as had occurred in the United States
in the early years of the twentieth century”.107 Thus, while in Hungary,
constitutional property protection is seen as a necessary tool in the pres103
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ervation of social services, in Canada, constitutional property protection
is seen as a possible threat to social services, programs, and vulnerable
minorities. As a result, it was intentionally omitted from the Charter.
Furthermore, it has limited application in attempting to secure constitutional protection for a minimal level of assistance.
However, an argument can be made for a Canadian application of
the Hungarian principle of property protection. In both Canada and
Hungary, the majority of citizens are not “self-pensioners…it is not
their own material goods that constitute social and economic security
in their inactive age; they live in a way that they invest a part of the
result of their work in social security”.108 In Hungary, due to the close
connection between property and social services, it was held that since
taken stricto sensu, law must provide for a security comparable to that
of property”.109
It is possible that for certain services, the same result could be found
in Canada. Canadians must submit a portion of their income to the
Canada Pension Plan (CPP) and Unemployment Insurance (UI). These
contributions could be interpreted by a court as “mandatory insurance”.
idated due to the Hungarian principle of property protection. However,
given the historical interaction between property and social services in
Canada, it is unlikely that this result would be found.

VII. CONCLUSION
It is crucial for Canada to achieve constitutional protection for a minimum level of social assistance. Without such protection, a substantial
portion of Canadian society will continue to live in abject poverty, without rights, and without the ability to participate in democratic discourse.
If protection is not achieved, a vulnerable group, the poverty collective,
will continue to have its interests overlooked and its needs neglected.
Without protection, the deliberative democratic ideal of full authorship
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will continue to be overwhelmed by the concept of authorship by those
who can afford to participate.110
Attempts have been made to achieve constitutional protection for
this minimum standard through the language of rights. These attempts
have failed. Given the importance of achieving protection for a minimum level of assistance, it is necessary to take another path, to explore
each and every alternative until a solution is found. Proceeding solely
through the language of rights risks exhausting debate. Over time, if the
same arguments continue to be circulated and rejected, conversation will
to the social question, on protecting a minimum level of assistance.
This paper attempted to take another path, to seek the constitutional
protection of a minimum level of assistance through means other than
rights. It did so by analyzing a jurisdiction that managed to protect social needs without resorting to the language of rights. However, the nonrights based concepts used in Hungary to protect social programs are
not directly applicable to the Canadian context.
Though arguments have been made, in each case, for the applicability of the principles of legal certainty, legitimate expectations, and
persuasive. In all probability, the solution to achieving a constitutionally
protected minimum level of assistance will not be found in the pages of
this paper. However, the analysis itself still has value.
The act of searching outside of the language of rights for a solution
to the problem of necessity helps subvert contemporary reliance on the
rights-based approach. It does so through the creation of an “autocritical” moment.111 By demonstrating that there is potentially more than one
path through which to provide constitutional protection for a minimum
level of assistance, this autocritical moment allows for the proliferation
of alternative sites of participation. Perhaps a South American court has
taken a different path towards a minimum level of assistance. Maybe an
alternative route can be found in municipal records in Geneva. Perhaps
the answer will be found in future decisions by the Hungarian Constitutional Court. With this proliferation of alternatives, discourse expands,
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conversation increases, and Canadian society draws closer to the ideal
of deliberative democracy.
Conversation is not enough. However, through conversation, attention is brought to the issue of a minimum level of assistance. As long as
conversation continues, the issue will not slip away. As long as solutions
are proposed, the legislature and the courts will not be able to disregard
the poverty collective.

